Where you are matters: Network position, designed network, and central government agency termination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ma, Liang; Liu, Weixing; Chen, Sicheng; Christensen, Tom
• 署名单位: Renmin University of China; University of International Business & Economics; Tsinghua University; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.13026
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 417-440
• 关键词: administrative reorganization; Political control; management; POLICY; LIFE; ORGANIZATIONS; survival; demise; MYTH; US

摘要

This study synthesizes insights from collaborative network and agency termination theories to investigate how agencies' positions in designed networks impact their survival probability. Using longitudinal data for the central apparatus in China from 2005 to 2020, along with the designed networks derived from 1243 joint tasks arranged by the State Council, we conducted event history analyses to test our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that a centralized network position can significantly reduce an agency's likelihood of termination, while agencies in the periphery of designed networks may be less likely to survive significant restructuring. It is also discovered that stronger agencies, such as larger, economically functioning, or statutorily created ones, benefit more from centralized network positions. These findings underscore the pivotal role played by agencies' positions within designed networks in their survival prospects. As such, agencies should strategically leverage their positions within collaborative networks to mitigate the risk of termination.