Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dusek, Libor; Pardo, Nicolas; Traxler, Christian
• 署名单位: Charles University Prague; Hertie School; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1520-6942
• DOI: 10.1002/pam.22387
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 426-449
• 关键词: tax compliance; ENFORCEMENT

摘要

This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rates. The effect is largest if both parameters are made salient. The most effective treatment yields a net revenue gain that covers approximately 25 percent of the labor costs of the ticket administration personnel. A survey experiment documents how the salience nudges alter prior (mis)perceptions about the communicated parameters. The survey results rationalize the differential effects of the treatments and, together with the evidence from the RCT, offer a broader framework for explaining why certain nudges are effective in some contexts but fail in others. (c) 2022 The Authors. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Association for Public Policy and Management.