The politics of administrative reform in East and Southeast Asia: From gridlock to continuous self-improvement?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Painter, M
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0952-1895.2004.00250.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 关键词: GOVERNANCE

摘要

This article compares patterns and outcomes of administrative reform in four countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. It focuses on the supply side, that is, on reform implementation. It is assumed that bureaucrats, upon whom implementation depends, have an interest in controlling the process. A distinction is made between two types of bureaucratic systems-autonomous and instrumental-according to structural features that increase the potential to block reforms. Four possible patterns of administrative reform are distinguished according to whether demand is high or low, and whether the bureaucracy can be classed as autonomous or instrumental. More broadly, it is argued that supply will be lower in autonomous bureaucratic systems. A comparative case study method is applied to test this model, and the proposition is not disconfirmed. Malaysia and Singapore, both classed as instrumental bureaucracies, demonstrate a predictable style of continuous administrative self-improvement. The status of the bureaucracy in Thailand and Taiwan is in transition, and the model is used to analyze changes in reform patterns over time and to suggest future trajectories.