Bi-level Programing Merger Evaluation and Application to Banking Operations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Desheng Dash; Luo, Cuicui; Wang, Haofei; Birge, John R.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Reykjavik University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.12205
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 498-515
• 关键词: data envelopment analysis; horizontal mergers; EFFICIENCY; acquisitions; cost; INFORMATION; ORGANIZATIONS; COMMUNICATION; profitability; INEFFICIENCY

摘要

The potential for operational efficiency improvement is a key consideration for firms contemplating the consolidation of both internal and external business units. This paper develops a leader-follower game model to assess such potential gains from the merger of different organizations with constrained resources. A profit-sharing strategy and algorithm are proposed to solve the model while maintaining incentive compatibility within each unit's decision-making process. This paper further demonstrates that in a framework, within the data envelopment analysis paradigm, a supply chain with an upstream leader and downstream followers is efficient if and only if both the leader and the followers are individually efficient. A case study of a banking operations merger shows how incentive compatible merger of operations can produce overall efficiency improvement.