Optimal project rejection and new firm start-ups

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cassiman, B; Ueda, M
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0458
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 262-275
• 关键词: real option; project selection; new firm start-ups; IPR; bargaining

摘要

We study the decision of an established firm to commercialize innovations. An innovation can be exploited by the established firm as an internal venture, pursued by a new firm start-up as an external venture, or not commercialized at all. The limited commercialization capacity of the established firm in the short run results in an option value of waiting. In this setup, start-up firms emerge when the established firm is generating many innovations or is selective because the option value of waiting is high, or both. The model predicts that innovations commercialized through internal ventures are characterized by a higher fit with the internal resources of the established firm, a higher cannibalization of the established firm's existing businesses, and a lower profitability than innovations commercialized through external ventures. The model furthermore generates predictions on the relation between firm performance and spin-off performance.