Pricing and lead time decisions in decentralized supply chains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Liming; Parlar, Mahmut; Zhu, Stuart X.
• 署名单位: Hong Kong Polytechnic University; McMaster University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0653
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 713-725
• 关键词: DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAINS; price- and lead-time-sensitive demand; customer utility; promised delivery lead time; Stackelberg game; decision inefficiency; operational and market factors; pricing; Double marginalization

摘要

his paper studies a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing price- and leadtime-sensitive demands. A Stackelberg game is constructed to analyze the price and lead time decisions by the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Using the performance of the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark, we show that decentralized decisions in general are inefficient and lead to inferior performance due to the double marginalization effect. However, further analysis shows that the decision inefficiency is strongly influenced by market and operational factors, and if the operational factors are dominating, it may not be significant. This shows that before pursuing a coordination strategy with retailers, a supplier should first improve his or her own internal operations.