License to Layoff? Unemployment Insurance and the Moral Cost of Layoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Keum, Dongil Daniel; Meier, Stephan
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2022.16734
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: managerial prosocial preferences; moral cost; layoffs; unemployment insurance; resource adjustment

摘要

This study presents moral cost as a novel behavioral constraint on firm resource adjustment, specifically layoff decisions that can cause severe harm to employ-ees. Revising the prevailing negative view of managers as purely self-interested, we propose that managers care about their employees and incur moral cost from layoffs. We leverage expansions in unemployment insurance as a quasi-natural experiment that reduces economic hardship for laid-off workers and, in turn, the moral cost of layoffs to managers. We find that these expansions license larger layoffs. The effects are stronger for chief executive officers (CEOs) with stronger prosocial preferences who dismiss fewer workers despite low performance, such as non-Republican, internally promoted, small town, or family firm CEOs, and weaker for CEOs who lack the discretion to avoid moral cost due to shareholder or financial pressures. Our findings suggest that the role of moral cost is substantial but also highly heterogeneous and readily suppressed by external pressures.