Bribery in the Workplace: A Field Experiment on the Threat of Making Group Behavior Visible

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dakhlallah, Diana
• 署名单位: McGill University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2021.15264
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1203-1223
• 关键词: bribery and corruption; group reputation; Social incentives; field experiment; public sector organizations; Healthcare

摘要

Can reputational threat among coworkers reduce bribery in organizations? I exploit within-and across-organizational variation in bribery to design and implement a field experiment in the maternity wards of five Moroccan public hospitals. I test whether threatening to reveal information about ward workers' involvement in bribery to their coworkers dissuades them from taking bribes from patients. Healthcare workers cut back on taking bribes in higher-incidence maternity wards but not in lower-incidence wards. Qualitative data show that bribery's baseline incidence sets the costs of revealing. Workers tolerate only so much bribery in their wards before they face the negative social consequences of belonging to a work group that takes bribes. They thus correct their behavior when it crosses a threshold. Moreover, ineffective applications of the field interventions betrayed welfare-diminishing effects. I furnish evidence for a novel kind of policy lever against workplace bribery and shed new light on the dynamics of bribery inside organizations.