Ownership structure and CEO compensation: Implications for the choice of foreign market entry modes

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Musteen, Martina; Datta, Deepak K.; Herrmann, Pol
• 署名单位: California State University System; San Diego State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2008.63
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 321-338
• 关键词: ENTRY-MODE CHOICE; corporate governance; Agency theory

摘要

Drawing on agency theory, corporate governance, and international business literatures, we develop arguments relating equity ownership structures and CEO compensation mix to a firm's choice of foreign market entry modes. Based on a sample of 432 foreign market entries by 118 non-diversified firms in the US manufacturing sector between 1991 and 1998, our findings indicate that greater equity ownership by institutional shareholders and inside directors is positively associated with a preference for full-control entry modes. In addition, our results suggest that CEOs with a greater proportion of pay tied to firm long-term performance are more inclined to choose full-control entry modes over shared-control modes.