Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Durnev, Art; Errunza, Vihang; Molchanov, Alexander
• 署名单位: McGill University; Massey University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2009.58
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1533-1562
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; POLITICAL RISK; BUSINESS PERFORMANCE; financial and industrial structure

摘要

In countries with secure property rights, corporate transparency improves investment efficiency and increases growth by alleviating information asymmetry. However, in countries with insecure property rights, greater transparency can increase the risk of government expropriation. Therefore some firms that would benefit most from transparency cannot take full advantage of it, as they set sub-optimal transparency levels. Using data from 59 industries in 69 countries, we find that in countries with weak property rights protection, industries that would benefit the most from transparency exhibit worse investment efficiency and grow more slowly than industries that can efficiently operate at minimal levels of transparency. Journal of International Business Studies (2009) 40, 1533-1562. doi: 10.1057/jibs.2009.58