AN AGENT MORALITY VIEW OF BUSINESS POLICY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: QUINN, DP; JONES, TM
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/258885
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 22-42
• 关键词: ownership; COSTS; firm

摘要

We develop a philosophical perspective on the moral obligations of managers, which we call agent morality, by examining the moral implications of agency theory. Our view is grounded in noninstrumental ethics, which we argue is logically superior to instrumental ethics. We show that the principal-agent model of the firm, once properly considered, requires that managers fashion business policies with reference first to certain moral duties and second to shareholder wealth.