A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Wiseman, RM; Gomez-Mejia, LR
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/259103
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 133-153
• 关键词: CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; research-and-development; Ownership structure; prospect-theory; Incentive compensation; RETURN ASSOCIATION; empirical-analysis; corporate-control; firm performance; decision-making

摘要

Building on agency and prospect theory views, we construct, in this article, a behavioral agency model of executive risk taking. In the model we combine elements of internal corporate governance with problem framing to explain executive risk-taking behavior. The model suggests that executive risk taking varies across and within different forms of monitoring and that agents may exhibit risk-seeking as well as risk-averse behaviors. We develop specific propositions that combine monitoring with performance and the framing of strategic problems to explain executive choices of strategic risk. The resulting propositions enhance and extend the agency-based corporate governance literature on executive risk taking.