Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berrone, Pascual; Cruz, Cristina; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.; Larraza-Kintana, Martin
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; IE University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; Universidad Publica de Navarra
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.2189/asqu.2010.55.1.82
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 82-113
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION; resource-based view; ceo pay; ENVIRONMENTAL-MANAGEMENT; executive-compensation; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; Impression management; Ownership structure; UNITED-STATES; performance

摘要

This paper compares the environmental performance of family and nonfamily public corporations between 1998 and 2002, using a sample of 194 U.S. firms required to report their emissions. We found that family-controlled public firms protect their socioemotional wealth by having a better environmental performance than their nonfamily counterparts, particularly at the local level, and that for the nonfamily firms, stock ownership by the chief executive officer (CEO) has a negative environmental impact. We also found that the positive effect of family ownership on environmental performance persists independently of whether the CEO is a family member or serves both as CEO and board chair.(circle)