The principal's other problems: Honest incompetence and the specification of objectives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hendry, J
• 署名单位: University of London; Birkbeck University London
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/4134371
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 98-113
• 关键词: ceo compensation; executive-compensation; AGENCY-THEORY; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; CHIEF EXECUTIVES; performance; OWNERSHIP; ECONOMICS; incentives; firm

摘要

In this article an extension of agency theory based on problems that arise in agency relationships, even when agents are assumed to be honest and dutiful, is put forward. With one exception, these assumptions lead to essentially the same predictions as in standard agency theory, suggesting that effects commonly attributed to self-seeking may be better understood as more fundamental effects of the agency relationship itself. This analysis raises a number of previously unexplored research questions concerning the nature of managerial agency relationships.