Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of learning and transaction cost perspectives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Argyres, Nicholas; Mayer, Kyle J.
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1060-1077
• 关键词: KNOWLEDGE-BASED THEORY; ORGANIZATION; alliances; COMMUNICATION; dimensions; OWNERSHIP; EVOLUTION; ECONOMICS; PROPERTY; CHOICE

摘要

Our aim is to unpack contract design capabilities for detailed commercial contracts, to draw out implications for the locus of such capabilities within the firm, and to examine implications for exploiting those capabilities as a potential source of competitive advantage. We argue that developing contract design capabilities involves learning how much and what kinds of detail to include in a contract. We further argue that knowledge about the management of these trade-offs resides differentially in managers, engineers, and lawyers regarding different types of contractual provisions.