THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF TOURNAMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BECKER, BE; HUSELID, MA
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.2307/2393228
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 336-350
• 关键词: productivity; performance

摘要

Tournament models have developed into an important component of the theoretical literature on organizational reward systems. However, with one exception there have been no empirical tests of the incentive effects of tournament models in a field setting. Drawing on a panel data set from auto racing, we show that the tournament spread (prize differential) does have incentive effects on both individual performance and driver safety, that these effects peak at higher spreads, and that controlling for the dollar value of the tournament spread, the prize distribution has little influence on individual performance.