ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE ADAPTATION: WHO IS IN, WHO IS OUT, AND WHO GETS WHAT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klein, Peter G.; Mahoney, Joseph T.; McGahan, Anita M.; Pitelis, Christos N.
• 署名单位: Baylor University; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Toronto; Abu Dhabi University; Brunel University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2014.0459
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 6-27
• 关键词: common pool; POLITICAL STRATEGY; CAPTURING VALUE; management; CONTRACT; AGENCY; institutions; COMPETITION; INNOVATION; KNOWLEDGE

摘要

Governance gives life to an organization by establishing the rules that shape organizational action. Structures of governance rest on stakeholder engagement, particularly on how stakeholders assess the prospects for earning a return by committing their specialized resources to the organization. Once formalized, governance structures and processes can resist change. Yet, under special circumstances, some stakeholders that are a party to an organization may seek to adapt governance in response to changes in the external environment that surrounds the organization. Adaptation often requires renegotiation: who has claims on the organization and who gets what? In this article we analyze the relationship between the institutional change that drives adaptation and the outcome of renegotiation. We draw on institutional economics and organization theory to identify four pathways of governance adaptation: continuity, architectural change, enfranchisement change, and redistribution. We call for further theoretical and empirical research on governance adaptation and its implications for organizational value creation and capture.