PROPERTY RIGHTS, OWNER-MANAGEMENT, AND VALUE CREATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schulze, William; Zellweger, Thomas
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of St Gallen
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2018.0377
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 489-511
• 关键词: TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS; VALUE CAPTURE; Family firms; Competitive advantage; corporate governance; BOUNDED RELIABILITY; Private Firms; BOARD CONTROL; AGENCY COSTS; self-control

摘要

Building on property rights theory, we explore the relationship among property rights, owner-management, and value creation in private firms. We suggest that property rights in the hands of owner-managers create strategic, incentive, and commitment benefits that facilitate value creation. However, the self-incentivizing nature of property rights engenders three control hazards-those related to reliability, egocentrism, and succession-that threaten stakeholder welfare. In order to mitigate these hazards, owner-managers must establish credible governance. We discuss four governance mechanisms often found in owner-managed firms: commitment to social control, delegation of authority to managers, submission to the hierarchy of a board, and partial transfer of ownership. Although these mechanisms help mitigate control hazards, they also constrain the value generating benefits of owner-management. Owner-managers thus face control dilemmas when determining how to best govern their firms. Our theory sheds new light on the relationship between property rights and value creation, and lays a foundation for exploring the benefits and liabilities of owner-management.