HOW A FIRM'S VALUE CAPTURE AFFECTS VALUE CREATION IN ITS ECOSYSTEM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: John, Kose; Ross, David Gaddis
• 署名单位: New York University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2019.0494
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 646-667
• 关键词: STRATEGIC FACTOR MARKETS; Competitive advantage; DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES; FORMAL CONTRACTS; CO-CREATION; INNOVATION; governance; incentives; integration; COOPERATION

摘要

Using a formal model, we develop a theory of how value capture by a firm with market or bargaining power dampens the incentives of other agents in its ecosystem, showing that the implications for value creation depend critically on the nature of the complementarities these agents generate. If complementarities are net positive, then dampening agents' incentives can dramatically reduce the value created in the ecosystem, even to zero-that is, the prospect of a firm's value capture may even prevent the firm itself from operating. Conversely, if complementarities are net negative, dampening agents' incentives can increase value creation by discouraging agents from imposing these negative complementarities on each other. The disincentivizing effects of a firm's value capture can be mitigated by enforceable contracts, cooperative governance, and self-organization by agents, but what is optimal for the agents or the firm may not be optimal for value creation in the ecosystem.