ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: AN INTEGRATED AGENCY-INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Berrone, Pascual; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2009.36461950
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 103-126
• 关键词: RESOURCE-BASED VIEW; ceo compensation; firm performance; stakeholder management; BOARD COMPOSITION; corporate boards; RISK; OWNERSHIP; IMPACT; pay

摘要

Relying on institutional theory, agency rationale, and environmental management research, we hypothesize that, in polluting industries, good environmental performance increases CEO pay; that environmental governance mechanisms strengthen this linkage; that pollution prevention strategies affect executive compensation more than end-of-pipe pollution control; and that long-term pay increases pollution prevention success. Using longitudinal data on 469 U.S. firms, we found support for three hypotheses. Contrary to our expectations, firms with an explicit environmental pay policy and an environmental committee do not reward environmental strategies more than those without such structures, suggesting that these mechanisms play a merely symbolic role.