RECONSIDERING PAY DISPERSION'S EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT WORK: RECONCILING SORTING AND PAY INEQUALITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Trevor, Charlie O.; Reilly, Greg; Gerhart, Barry
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Connecticut
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2006.0127
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 585-610
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; executive-compensation; productive efficiency; SALARY DISTRIBUTION; firm performance; wage dispersion; TOP MANAGEMENT; tournament; turnover; individuals

摘要

Pay dispersion in interdependent work settings is virtually universally argued to be detrimental to performance. We contend, however, that these arguments often confound inequality with inequity, thereby overestimating inequity concerns. Consequently, we adopt a sorting (attraction and retention) perspective to differentiate between pay dispersion that is used to secure valued employee inputs and pay dispersion that is not so used. We find that the former is positively related to interdependent team performance, the latter has no effect or is detrimental, and the approach itself helps to reconcile the pay dispersion literature's disparate results. Curvilinearity tests reveal potential constraints on the sorting argument.