TIME FOR ME TO FLY: PREDICTING DIRECTOR EXIT AT LARGE FIRMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boivie, Steven; Graffin, Scott D.; Pollock, Timothy G.
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2010.1083
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1334-1359
• 关键词: SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY; ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION; executive-compensation; social identity; TOP MANAGEMENT; BOARD; performance; OWNERSHIP; CONSEQUENCES; motivation

摘要

One of the great unanswered questions in governance research is, Why do directors serve on boards? Drawing on self-determination theory, a theory of total motivation that combines both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, we find that the prestige associated with being a director, the ability to have influence, and identification with the director role make directors less likely to exit; however, demotivating factors related to the time commitment required, such as holding other board appointments or serving as a CEO at another company, increase the likelihood of director exits. Finally, we find that the value of being on the board of a prestigious firm diminishes when the firm experiences events that tarnish its prestige, although these same events decrease the likelihood of director exit when firm prestige is lacking.