WATCHDOG OR LAPDOG? A BEHAVIORAL VIEW OF THE MEDIA AS A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bednar, Michael K.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2009.0862
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 131-150
• 关键词: executive-compensation; SYMBOLIC MANAGEMENT; Board independence; ceo compensation; performance; DIRECTORS; industry; POWER; legitimacy; attention

摘要

This study begins to provide a behavioral view of the media and corporate governance by showing how firms enact largely symbolic governance changes with respect to board independence that essentially protect managerial interests, yet still elicit positive responses from the media. I show why this media response is important for firm leaders by examining how more favorable media coverage may affect CEO job security, executive compensation, and board composition. To the extent that largely symbolic actions affect media coverage, this study raises questions about the effectiveness of the media as a governance control mechanism.