PASSING PROBATION: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BY INTERIM CEOS AND ITS EFFECT ON THEIR PROMOTION PROSPECTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Guoli; Luo, Shuqing; Tang, Yi; Tong, Jamie Y.
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School; National University of Singapore; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; University of Western Australia
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2013.0351
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1389-1418
• 关键词: IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT; firm performance; STRATEGIC CHANGE; information asymmetry; corporate governance; Ownership structure; TOP MANAGEMENT; BONUS SCHEMES; BOARD; succession

摘要

Drawing on chief executive officer (CEO) succession research and the impression management literature, we examine earnings management by interim CEOs, its impact on interim CEOs' promotion prospects, and the moderating effect of governance mechanisms on the relationship between the two. Based on a sample of 145 interim CEO succession events in U.S. public firms from 2004 to 2008, we find that (a) an interim CEO is more likely than a noninterim CEO to engage in earnings management to improve firm earnings performance (income-increasing earnings management), (b) the greater the income-increasing earnings management, the more likely it is that the interim CEO will be promoted to the permanent position, and (c) the relationship between earnings management and the likelihood of interim CEO promotion is weakened when effective internal and external governance mechanisms are in place.