FAMILY- VERSUS LONE-FOUNDER-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cannella, Albert A., Jr.; Jones, Carla D.; Withers, Michael C.
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Texas State University System; Sam Houston State University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2012.0045
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 436-459
• 关键词: research-and-development; ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION; institutional investors; Ownership structure; AGENCY COSTS; firm performance; INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; COMPETITIVE ACTIONS; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We distinguish between family companies, involving multiple family members as owners and/or managers, and lone-founder companies, involving only the founder and no other family members. We apply social identity theory and organizational identification to elucidate the differences between these two types of firms, and how their differing organizational identities reflect unique desires for control and influence. We then consider how these differences are reflected in a firm's board structure (i.e., directorship interlocks, director experiences, and director tenures). Specifically, we predict that family firms are more likely to interlock with other family firms, select directors with more experience in family firms, and keep directors on their boards longer. Correspondingly, we posit that family firms are less likely to interlock with lone-founder firms or to select directors with experience in lone-founder-controlled firms. Lone-founder firms follow a similar pattern. We also consider the consequences of family and lone-founder ownership and board structures on the investment behavior of three classes of institutional investors. We test our hypotheses with a sample of publicly traded corporations between 1991 and 2006, and report strong support for most of our predictions.