Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gorton, Gary; Kahl, Matthias; Rosen, Richard J.
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01465.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1291-1344
• 关键词: corporate-control; market valuation; TAKEOVER TARGETS; Risk reduction; performance; bidder; gains; OWNERSHIP; payment; drive

摘要

We propose a theory of mergers that combines managerial merger motives with an industry-level regime shift that may lead to value-increasing merger opportunities. Anticipation of these merger opportunities can lead to defensive acquisitions, where managers acquire other firms to avoid losing private benefits if their firms are acquired, or positioning acquisitions, where firms position themselves as more attractive takeover targets to earn takeover premia. The identity of acquirers and targets and the profitability of acquisitions depend on the distribution of firm sizes within an industry, among other factors. We find empirical support for some unique predictions of our theory.