Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morrison, Alan D.; White, Lucy
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01460.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1099-1142
• 关键词: Capital requirements; LIBERALIZATION; banking; MARKET

摘要

We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best-regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry-picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better-regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry-picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better-regulated economy.