PSEUDO-PRECISION? PRECISE FORECASTS AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN MANAGERIAL EARNINGS FORECASTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hayward, Mathew L. A.; Fitza, Markus A.
• 署名单位: Monash University; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Newcastle
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2014.0304
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1094-1116
• 关键词: Information asymmetry; firm; overconfidence; CEOS; CONSEQUENCES; acquisitions; performance; incentives; disclosure; responses

摘要

We examine earnings guidance precision as a mechanism of organization impression management (OIM) and, specifically, suggest that strategic leaders use more precise earnings forecasts as an OIM tactic to convey a greater sense of authority and control over organizational performance after material organizational setbacks. Contributing to the OIM literature, we argue that the use of more precise judgment makes use of different psychological mechanisms compared to kinds of OIM that have been previously studied. The results presented here suggest that (a) OIM is an important motivation for more precise earnings forecasts, (b) precision as an OIM tactic is more likely to arise when managers convey impressions of brighter performance prospects, and (c) investors generally respond favorably to the tactic.