CEO Preferences and Acquisitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jenter, Dirk; Lewellen, Katharina
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12283
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2813-2852
• 关键词: managerial incentives; Ownership structure; golden parachutes; market valuation; TARGET CEOS; corporate; STOCK; overconfidence; performance; governance

摘要

This paper explores the impact of target CEOs' retirement preferences on takeovers. Using retirement age as a proxy for CEOs' private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEOs' preferences affect merger activity. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Takeover premiums and target announcement returns are similar for retirement-age and younger CEOs, implying that retirement-age CEOs increase firm sales without sacrificing premiums. Better corporate governance is associated with more acquisitions of firms led by young CEOs, and with a smaller increase in deals at retirement age.