WHO IS PUNISHED MOST FOR CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ody-Brasier, Amandine; Vermeulen, Freek
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2017.0683
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1621-1651
• 关键词: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE; Altruistic punishment; CAPITAL-PUNISHMENT; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; IDENTITY; MARKET; ATTRIBUTIONS; AUTHENTICITY; coevolution; industry

摘要

Over time, markets evolve into particular structures, with clearly defined roles in terms of who does what in the industry. When a firm ventures beyond these established roles, it often gets punished by its exchange partners. Our interviews in the Champagne grape market, however, suggest that some buyers are penalized more than others in such circumstances. Quantitative analysis confirms that nontraditional buyers receive price penalties for role deviations-through diversification, vertical integration, or disintegration-whereas traditional firms are treated more leniently. A subsequent interpretivist study, using interview data from 78 market participants to explore the exact mechanisms underlying this effect, reveals that sellers blame less traditional buyers when they cross the boundaries of their usual roles because they are thought to act out of volition and bad faith, whereas the same transgressions by more traditional firms are believed to have been necessitated by external circumstances. We conclude that the sanctioning behavior of actors in response to role transgressions by their exchange partners is driven by their interpretation of the motives underlying these transgressions, rather than by the actions themselves. As a result, nontraditional firms may find it difficult to deviate from the traditional roles in their industry.