The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aggarwal, Reena; Saffi, Pedro A. C.; Sturgess, Jason
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; University of Cambridge; DePaul University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12284
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2309-2346
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; Ownership structure; Hedge funds; earnings; INFORMATION; VOTE; EFFICIENCY; equity

摘要

This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance.