ADVANCE 'EM TO ATTRACT 'EM: HOW PROMOTIONS INFLUENCE APPLICATIONS IN INTERNAL TALENT MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Keller, J. R.; Dlugos, Kathryn
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2021.1174
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1831-1859
• 关键词: JOB-SATISFACTION; CAREER DYNAMICS; HIGH PERFORMERS; mobility; ORGANIZATIONS; determinants; RECRUITMENT; predictors; GENDER; CHOICE

摘要

Organizations increasingly turn to internal talent markets to facilitate employees' movement to new jobs within the firm. A key assumption in academic and practitioner accounts of these markets is that they are effective largely because employees are free to apply and be hired into open internal jobs. Wedraw on the career sponsorship and talent hoarding literatures to question this assumption, highlighting how individual managers facilitate (and hinder) mobility within these markets. We integrate signaling theory to extend this work, positing that signals of managers' willingness to support subordinates' advancement shapes which opportunities employees throughout the firm choose to pursue. Specifically, we argue that open jobs reporting to managers who have secured more promotions for their subordinates will be seen as particularly attractive, generating more internal applications. Our analysis of 96,712 internal applications submitted to 9,896 jobs over a five-year period within a large organization reveals that managers whose subordinates are more frequently promoted subsequently attract more, better, and more functionally diverse internal applicants for their open jobs. We complement these results with qualitative evidence from 30 interviews with managers across four organizations. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the broader functioning of internal talent markets.