Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Luo, Dan
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13453
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: information; uncertainty; conflicts

摘要

An entrepreneur makes offers to multiple investors to fund a project that requires a minimum investment. Concerned about other investors' decisions, each investor strategically communicates information about the project to others. When investors have conflicts of interest, those with contractually stronger incentives to invest attempt to persuade others to invest. Depending on the project's ex ante quality, the entrepreneur may promise investors different returns to create conflicts of interest and induce persuasion, or may promise investors an identical return to align their interests and induce truthful communication. The paper illustrates a new motivation for syndication and hierarchy within syndicates.