Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a randomized field experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.298
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 298-317
• 关键词: utility-theory; LABOR; DECISION; aversion

摘要

Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant substitution effects. It is possible that these results are due to constraints on workers' labor supply choices. We conducted afield experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose hours worked and effort per hour. We document a large positive elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger elasticity of hours, which implies that the elasticity of effort per hour is negative. We examine two candidate models to explain these findings: a modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods, and a model with reference dependent, loss-averse preferences. With the help of a further experiment, we can show that only loss-averse individuals exhibit a negative effort response to the wage increase.