Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Einav, Liran; Finkelstein, Amy; Ryan, Stephen P.; Schrimpf, Paul; Cullen, Mark R.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of British Columbia; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.178
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 178-219
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; welfare; ECONOMICS; models; cost; plan

摘要

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral (moral hazard) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral hazard. Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogenous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to overestimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. (JEL D82, G22, I13, J32)