On the Selection of Arbitrators

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Knight, Brian
• 署名单位: Brown University; Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3434
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 3434-3458
• 关键词: SUBGAME PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION; backward induction; SCHOOL MATCH; game-theory; RECIPROCITY; intentions; ELECTIONS; ECONOMICS; DESIGN; polls

摘要

A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, - theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank-a simultaneous procedure commonly used in practice-and develop a new sequential procedure-shortlisting-with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the shortlisting procedure.