The Power of Communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rahman, David
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3737
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 3737-3751
• 关键词: Repeated games; folk theorem; INFORMATION; collusion; partnerships

摘要

In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make my case in the context of a repeated Cournot oligopoly with flexible production, prices that follow a Brownian motion and no monetary side payments, an environment where it has previously been argued that any collusion is impossible. Trade associations can easily facilitate collusion by mediating communication amongst firms.