Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
• 署名单位: Koc University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.7.2014
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2014-2048
• 关键词: COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS; imperfect information; rational-expectations; private information; credit markets; equilibrium; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; ELECTIONS; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information.