Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashraf, Nava; Field, Erica; Lee, Jean
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Duke University; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.7.2210
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2210-2237
• 关键词: contraceptive use; marriage market; decision-making; allocation; RESOURCES; pregnancy; husbands; Abortion; VIOLENCE

摘要

We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable.