Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Crawford, Gregory S.; Pavanini, Nicola; Schivardi, Fabiano
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Tilburg University; Luiss Guido Carli University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150487
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1659-1701
• 关键词: insurance markets; DISCRIMINANT-ANALYSIS; adverse selection; credit; mergers; models; distance; BEHAVIOR; welfare; matter

摘要

We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks' market power can mitigate these negative effects.