An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply
成果类型：
Editorial Material
署名作者：
Ausubel, Lawrence M.
署名单位：
University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20171408
发表日期：
2018
页码：
561-563
关键词：
摘要：
In a comment, Okamoto (2018) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding. (JET. D44)