The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Condra, Luke N.; Long, James D.; Shaver, Andrew C.; Wright, Austin L.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Dartmouth College; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170416
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 3199-3231
• 关键词: ELECTION FRAUD EVIDENCE; TERRORISM; CONFLICT; outcomes; origins; weather

摘要

Competitive elections are essential to establishing the political legitimacy of democratizing regimes. We argue that insurgents undermine the state's mandate through electoral violence. We study insurgent violence during elections using newly declassified microdata on the conflict in Afghanistan. Our data track insurgent activity by hour to within meters of attack locations. Our results suggest that insurgents carefully calibrate their production of violence during elections to avoid harming civilians. Leveraging a novel instrumental variables approach, we find that violence depresses voting. Collectively, the results suggest insurgents try to depress turnout while avoiding backlash from harming civilians. Counterfactual exercises provide potentially actionable insights for safeguarding at-risk elections and enhancing electoral legitimacy in emerging democracies.