An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment
成果类型：
Editorial Material
署名作者：
Okamoto, Noriaki
署名单位：
Keio University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20160970
发表日期：
2018
页码：
555-560
关键词：
摘要：
Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. (JEL D44)