Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dinerstein, Michael; Einav, Liran; Levin, Jonathan; Sundaresan, Neel
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Stanford University; Microsoft
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171218
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1820-1859
• 关键词: product differentiation; 2-sided markets; INFORMATION; COSTS; obfuscation; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; industry; models

摘要

The platform design, the process that helps potential buyers on the internet navigate toward products they may purchase, plays a - critical role in reducing search frictions and determining market outcomes. We study a key - trade-off associated with two important roles of - efficient platform design: guiding consumers to their most desired product while also strengthening seller incentives to lower prices. We use simple theory to illustrate this, and then combine detailed browsing data from eBay and an equilibrium model of consumer search and price competition to quantitatively assess this - trade-off in the particular context of a change in eBay's marketplace design.