The Design and Price of Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Smolin, Alex
• 署名单位: Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161079
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-48
• 关键词: mechanism; MARKET; disclosure; monopoly

摘要

A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments.