The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xu, Guo
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171339
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 3170-3198
• 关键词: state capacity; career concerns; connections; incentives; ORGANIZATIONS; performance; WORKPLACE; CHINA

摘要

I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854-1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.