Auctions with Limited Commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Qingmin; Mierendorff, Konrad; Shi, Xianwen; Zhong, Weijie
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of London; University College London; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170882
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 876-910
• 关键词: DYNAMIC MONOPOLY; RENEGOTIATION; DESIGN

摘要

We study the role of limited commitment in a standard auction environment. In each period, the seller can commit to an auction with a reserve price but not to future reserve prices. We characterize the set of equilibrium profits attainable for the seller as the period length vanishes. An immediate sale by efficient auction is optimal when there are at least three buyers. For many natural distributions two buyers is enough. Otherwise, we give conditions under which the maximal profit is attained through continuously declining reserve prices.