Incentives and the Supply of Effective Charter Schools

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Singleton, John D.
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171484
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2568-2612
• 关键词: student-achievement; NONPROFIT SECTOR; empirical-model; CHOICE; entry; COMPETITION; vouchers; impacts; QUALITY; cost

摘要

Charter school funding is typically set by formulas that provide the same amount for students regardless of advantage or need. I present evidence that this policy skews the distribution of students served by charters toward low-cost populations by influencing where charter schools open and whether they survive. To do this, I develop and estimate an equilibrium model of charter school supply and competition to evaluate the effects of funding policies that aim to correct these incentives. The results indicate that a cost-adjusted funding formula would increase the share of disadvantaged students in charter schools with little reduction in aggregate effectiveness.