Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kessler, Judd B.; Low, Corinne; Sullivan, Colin D.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181714
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3713-3744
• 关键词: labor-market; field experiment; discrimination theory; audit; unemployment; INFORMATION; PREJUDICE; service; workers; BIAS

摘要

We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.