Test Design and Minimum Standards

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DeMarzo, Peter M.; Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171722
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2173-2207
• 关键词: disclosure; certification

摘要

We analyze test design and certification standards when an uninformed seller has the option to generate and disclose costly information regarding asset quality. We characterize equilibria by a minimum principle: the test and disclosure policy are chosen to minimize the asset's value conditional on nondisclosure. Thus, when sellers choose the information provided, simple pass/fail certification tests are likely to dominate the market. A social planner could raise informational and allocative efficiency, and lower deadweight testing costs, by raising the certification standard. Monopolist certifiers also satisfy the minimum principle but set a higher standard and reduce testing rates to maximize revenue. (JEL D42, D83, L12, L15)